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 The NCAA men’s basketball tournament paid out over $122 million to athletic 
conferences during the 2005-06 season alone. 1  Using data from previous basketball 
seasons, I formulate a theory as to the actions athletic conferences may encourage their 
basketball referees to take in order to enhance their share of the purse. If we consider the 
individual team within a group of college teams acting as a division of the larger “firm,” 
that being the conference and not an individual “firm” itself, then it is appropriate to 
suggest a single team would allow actions that at first glance seem detrimental. Initial 
research into referees’ actions during games provides some slight evidence toward their 
favoring of particular teams depending on the possibility of those teams entering the 
tournament. Additionally, evidence is found to support the idea of the “home-court” 
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Near the end of the 2004 football season, the University of Texas—ranked #6 in 
the Bowl Championship Series (BCS)2—played the University of Kansas, which at the 
time only had one conference win and an overall losing record. With 4:11 remaining in 
the game, Texas trailed Kansas 13 to 23. Texas managed to score two touchdowns and 
win the game 27 to 23. After Texas scored the first touchdown, Kansas had a chance to 
secure the victory on a pass which would have given them a first down, effectively 
allowing Kansas to run out the clock. Instead of a first down, Kansas was called for what 
was considered a controversial offensive pass interference penalty. Kansas eventually had 
to punt the ball out of its own end zone giving the ball back to Texas with 1:53 left. Texas 
scored and won the game. Had Texas lost the game, it would likely have missed the 
opportunity to play in one of the BCS bowl games. The BCS bowl games pay out a 
substantially larger amount to participating teams than do Non-BCS bowl games. After 
the game, an obviously upset Kansas head football coach, Mark Mangino, commented, 
“You know what this is all about, don’t you? BCS. That’s what made a difference today 
in the game. That’s what made the difference in a call in front of their bench. Dollar 
signs.” Mangino was fined by the Big 12 Conference and later issued an apology for his 
comments.3 
                                                 
2 The BCS is the current system used to determine the teams that will play for the National Championship, 
Fiesta Bowl, Orange Bowl, Rose Bowl, and Sugar Bowl. 
3 http://sports.yahoo.com/ncaaf/recap?gid=200411130020 
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 In sports, you can publicly comment on the performance or lack thereof from your 
own team, players, or coaches, and while most times it is seen as poor taste, you can 
comment on the opponent, but the officials are off limits. They are present to manage the 
game, and their only concern is that those involved play fairly. To suggest that an 
official’s actions only have consequences on the field of play is not plausible. Major 
college football and basketball are significant revenue-generating endeavors, and who 
wins and who loses can affect a conference’s bottom line. Maybe frustrated coach 
Mangino was fined by the Big 12 Conference for impugning the integrity of officials, or 
maybe he was fined for pointing out the proverbial 800-pound gorilla in the room that 
some would prefer to go unnoticed. The question to answer is simple: “Do conference 
officials manage a game with the understanding they can affect a game? If true, do they 
have instruction to do so in the interest of revenue concerns, or are they simply neutral 
participants?” While it would be interesting to investigate both major revenue-generating 
college sports, football and basketball, this paper focuses on basketball and how referees 
can potentially influence the game. 
Currently, of the 330 National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division 
I-A college basketball programs, only eight are not members of an athletic conference.4 
Since the majority of university athletic programs form conferences with other teams, 
there must be some benefit to this practice. I contend a university is interested in 
increasing revenues, and forming or joining a conference is a revenue-enhancing action. 
They do this not by acting as a coalition of individual competing firms, but rather sub-
                                                 
4 As of 2006, Birmingham Southern, Centenary, Lipscomb, Morris Brown, Savannah St., Texas A&M 
Corpus Christi, Texas Pan American, and IUPU Ft. Wayne are not affiliated with a conference. 
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units or divisions of a larger firm—the firm being the respective conference. While the 
university to which the athletic department belongs is an individual institution, the 
athletic department freely adheres to mandates and regulations put forth by the authority 
of the conference. A single university may take issue with certain regulations or 
requirements, and if that does occur, eventually the university can withdraw its 
conference membership5. However, this rarely occurs, and universities will generally, if 
only begrudgingly, agree to implement conference mandates. If a university is willing to 
let its athletic department submit to policy from an exterior entity, then it must be an 
advantageous arrangement. As a result, the university becomes a component of the larger 
firm under the control of the commissioner.  
The main goal of the firm’s controlling agent—in this case the conference 
commissioner—should therefore be to maximize revenues to the conference thereby 
increasing revenues to the member university above what they could achieve 
individually. 6  We see this behavior already in professional sports markets like the 
National Football League (NFL), National Basketball Association (NBA), Major League 
Baseball (MLB), and National Hockey League (NHL). The NFL acts as single firm with 
30 individual “sub-unit” members who agree to a revenue sharing program. The goal is 
maximizing revenues to the NFL, not to the Chicago Bears® or Carolina Panthers®. 
Successfully generating revenue for the league is the main objective even as 32 
                                                 
5 The University of South Carolina was a founding member of the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), but 
left in 1971. 
6 Firm optimization theory normally says to maximize profits. The assumption of maximizing revenue will 
be explained in chapter IV. Alternatively, I could assume marginal cost is zero in my modeling process to 
reach the same outcome. 
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individual teams compete on the field and in the market for players to win the Super 
Bowl.  
 In economic theory, the firm is considered a profit-maximizing entity, and in this 
instance, the focus is on the revenue portion of the optimization problem. This paper does 
not deal with the concept of how a firm will operate in collegiate athletics, which is 
already assumed. Instead, this paper focuses on the idea of what constitutes a firm at the 
collegiate level and the actions of its employees. Once the firm is defined appropriately, 
we may see observed actions follow the basic theory of the firm. 
It would be rational for the conferences to operate in the same fashion as the 
professional leagues, but the major difference is that there is more than just one dominate 
firm on the college level. The coalition of universities does not compete within the 
conference for payouts available to all university athletic programs. The conferences do 
however compete with each other within the NCAA.7 The formation of a conference has 
the potential to increase revenues in several ways, including negotiations over television 
and radio contracts, football bowl game affiliations, and merchandise contracts, to 
mention a few. This paper concentrates on revenues collected by conferences from 
participating in the NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament and how the actions of referees 
can potentially increase a conference’s share of the funds from the tournament. Nowhere 
in this paper do I suggest the presence of a bias towards particular teams within a given 
                                                 
7 This statement is made in reference to the research done in this paper. The NCAA members have quite 
successfully colluded in the efforts to reduce the cost to the university at the expense of major sports 
athletes, and this is agreed upon across all conferences. There is ample research on this topic of the NCAA 
if the reader is interested. 
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conference, but rather that at the end of the season, officials may seem to favor one team 
over by making marginal calls to benefit the conference as a whole. 
Using data from previous seasons, I attempt to explain the incentives for 
conferences to have “proactive” basketball officials created by the tournament system 
and test for any evidence of such actions. Basketball is somewhat unique in that the 
officials’ decisions can lead to an immediate change of possession of the ball and/or an 
opportunity to score points. However, a referee can only make a decision favoring one 
team in certain situations. Continuous blatant favoritism and numerous errant calls would 
not go unnoticed. At it relates to referees favoring specific teams, the actions of officials 
are more important than the ability of the players, so the data of interest involves fouls 
called during a game instead of actual win totals. The players themselves will have the 
largest effect on the outcome of the game. The referee can award free-throw opportunities 
to a team by calling a foul, but he can not make the ball go in the basket. The neutrality of 
judges may be less important than the chance to increase revenues to all parties. The mere 
notion of participants of any athletic event acting in a way that impugns the purity of 
sports is distasteful to many, but it does and has happened.8 However, like professional 
leagues, men’s college basketball is a revenue-generating endeavor, and the behavior of 
those involved should follow that of other firms; therefore, it is worth investigation.  
 
 
                                                 







THE COMPETITIVE ORGANIZATION OF COLLEGE BASKETBALL 
 
 This chapter is a summary of college basketball and the NCAA tournament 
system along with a list of the conferences covered in this paper. Most of this will be 
general knowledge for those familiar with college basketball, but the section on the 
NCAA tournament and the payout structure of revenues to conferences is not likely 
understood by many.  
2.1 The Regular Season 
 The college basketball season is not identical for every member university, but the 
scheduling for a team follows the same basic pattern. Each university has a schedule 
made up of 30 games plus or minus an additional game. The university’s basketball team 
plays other teams not affiliated with their conference as well as conference member 
teams. The “non-conference” or “out-of-conference” games make up the majority of 
games in the first half of the season. Universities may be invited to participate in 
tournaments at the beginning of the season in places such as Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and 
Alaska in an attempt provide match ups between teams rarely scheduled to play. Many of 
the games at the beginning of the season are scheduled between a team from one of the 
major conferences and a team from the one of the smaller conferences.9 Some games are 
scheduled between major conference teams for television purposes. 10 Still others are 
scheduled between non-conference member universities for yearly in-state or regional 
                                                 
9 Exactly which conferences are considered “major” will be explained later in this chapter. 
10 The ESPN “BIG 10/ACC Challenge” for example. 
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athletic rivalries, and many games are scheduled on a two year “home and home” basis 
among teams consistently ranked for television purposes.11 
 The second half of the season is when conferences play games between university 
members. Each basketball team plays the same number of games with conference 
members. Sixteen games is the typical number of conference games.12 Some teams will 
play each other twice and others only once in a given season. The schedule within the 
conference is designed to rotate “home” and “visiting” designation while accounting for 
historical match-ups between teams in the conference. 13  The regular-season games 
determine the ranking in the conference tournament at the end of the season.  
2.2 The Conference Tournaments 
 All of the major, mid-major, and smaller conferences have a tournament at the 
end of the season. They are arranged as a single elimination tournament. Some 
conferences have all teams participate while others allow a particular number of teams to 
qualify, such as only allowing the top eight or ten teams to compete. Generally, the 
conference tournament champion is guaranteed a slot in the NCAA tournament as the 
representative of the given conference. Teams do not have to win their respective 
conference tournament to receive an invitation to the NCAA tournament, but teams from 
the lesser-know conferences rarely receive an invitation unless they are conference 
champions. 
 
                                                 
11 “Home and Home” is an agreement between universities where Team A travels to play Team B, and the 
follow year Team B agrees to play at Team A’s home court. 
12 The Pacific-10 Conference plays an 18 game conference schedule. 
13 Before Duke and the University of North Carolina would agree to expand the ACC from 8 to 12 teams, 
they had to be guaranteed to always play each other twice during the regular season.  
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2.3  The NCAA Tournament 
 The NCAA tournament is a single elimination tournament, which at the time of 
this paper, begins with 65 teams. The first game, the “play in game,” is between the 64th 
and 65th team in order to reduce the field to an even number before the tournament 
begins. Once the tournament begins, each round eliminates half of the field until there is 
an overall champion (64, 32, 16, 8, 4, 2, and finally 1). The 64 teams are separated into 
four sections of 16 teams. In each section, each team is ranked 1 through 16 by the 
tournament selection committee. The teams considered relatively more talented are given 
a ranking of 1 and the least talented are given a 16 ranking. Each ranking is called a 
“seed.” Each bracket of teams is reduced to one remaining team, and those teams play the 
winners of the three other brackets in the single elimination playoff.  
Teams are selected to participate in the tournament by one of two criteria. Thirty-
one teams are automatically qualified for the tournament by representing their respective 
conference. These teams are either the conference-tournament champions or regular-
season champions depending on the conference. Thirty-four teams are given “at large” 
bids for the tournament. The “at large” teams are determined by the selection committee 
which uses several factors in deciding which teams to choose including, but not limited to 
overall wins, conference wins, and quality of opponents. Based on their superior 
performance through the course of a season, some teams will earn an “at large” bid 
regardless of winning or losing their respective conference tournament championship. 
The remaining bids are given to other marginally talented teams. These teams are referred 
to as “bubble” teams because even though they may qualify for the tournament they are 
 10 
not guaranteed a place in the tournament. While the same factors are used to measure all 
the teams, there seems to be some discretion in the “bubble” teams chosen by the 
selection committee. There is no publicized explanation for choices made by the selection 
committee, meetings are not open to the public, nor is the selection committee required to 
justify choices to the universities or public. 
The conferences affiliated with the Men’s National Basketball Tournament are 
paid revenues from the tournament based on the system where teams earn “units.” The 
following is from the NCAA website explaining how the NCAA distributes revenue to 
the conferences: 
The basketball fund provides for moneys to be distributed to Division I 
conferences based on their performance in the Division I Men’s Basketball 
Championship over a six-year rolling period (for the period 2000-2005 for the 
2005-06 distribution). Independent institutions receive a full unit share based on 
its tournament participation over the same rolling six-year period. The basketball 
fund payments are sent to conferences and independent institutions in mid-April 
each year. One unit is awarded to each institution participating in each game, 
except the championship game. In 2004-05, each basketball unit was awarded 
approximately $152,000 for a total $113.7 million distribution. In 2005-06, each 
basketball unit will be awarded approximately $164,000 for a total $122.8 million 
distribution.14 
                                                 
14 http://www1.ncaa.org/finance/revenue_distribution_plan 
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A conference is paid based on the number of units earned by its teams that year and the 
preceding five years. There are no units earned for the final championship game. The 
money is sent to the conferences and not to the individual teams unless the school does 
not belong to a conference. How the money is distributed after that is dependent on the 
conference rules.  
2.4 The Six Major Conferences 
 Of the 31 conferences affiliated with NCAA, only six are considered major 
conferences.15 The universities making up these six conference members are generally 
the larger state schools, but some are private institutions. Seventy-three of the 330 (I-A) 
universities are in these six conferences. The history of how they became the dominant 
players in the world of college sports is interesting but beyond the scope of the paper. 










                                                 
15 In football, the conference champions of these six conferences are the only teams guaranteed an 
invitation to the BCS bowl games. 
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Table 2.0 Teams of the Major Conferences 
 
Atlantic Coast Conference 
(ACC) 
 
Big East Conference 
(Big East) 
 






Florida State University 
Georgia Tech 
University of Maryland 
University of Miami 
Univ. of North Carolina  
North Carolina State Univ. 
University of Virginia 
Virginia Tech 
Wake Forest University 
 
 
University of Cincinnati 
University of Connecticut 
DePaul University 
Georgetown University 
University of Louisville 
Marquette University 
University of Notre Dame 
University of Pittsburgh 
Providence College 
Rutgers University 
St. John’s University 
Seton Hall University 
University of South Florida 
Syracuse University 
Villanova University 
West Virginia University  
 
 
University of Illinois 
Indiana University 
University of Iowa 
University of Michigan 
Michigan State University 
University of Minnesota 
Northwestern University 
Ohio State University 
Penn State University 
Purdue University 
University of Wisconsin 
 
Big Twelve Conference 
(Big 12) 
 







University of Colorado 
Iowa State University 
University of Kansas 
Kansas State University 
University of Missouri 
University of Nebraska 
University of Oklahoma 
Oklahoma State University 
University of Texas 
Texas A&M University 
Texas Tech University 
 
 
University of Arizona 
Arizona State University 
University of California 
University of Oregon 
Oregon State University 
Stanford University 
Univ. of Cal. Los Angeles 
Univ. of Southern Cal. 
University of Washington 
Washington State Univ. 
 
University of Alabama 
University of Arkansas 
Auburn University 
University of Florida 
University of Georgia 
University of Kentucky 
Louisiana State University 
University of Mississippi 
Mississippi State Univ. 
Univ. of South Carolina 











3.1 Introduction  
This section focuses on two different existing areas of important research in my 
examination of college basketball referees: the interplay of officials and their potential 
effect on sporting outcomes and the discussion of the organizational structure and nature 
on sporting leagues as it relates to noncompetitive agreements. In addition, there are other 
theories I am able to draw from in creating my model of behavior. While there is 
extensive research in the field of sports economics—some even about referees—there is 
very little empirical or theoretical analysis of basket officials as active participants with 
which to compare my work.16 Fortunately, however, there is such research related to 
referees in different sports in the economic literature and within other fields of study. The 
literature associated with league structure provides the foundation for the essential 
assumption that the controlling conference agents will favor referee involvement in the 
interest of maximizing conference revenues. 
3.2 Referees as Active Participants 
 The work done on referees in soccer17 by Garicano et al. (2005) and Rickman and 
Witt (2005) provide empirical evidence of referee bias based on the circumstances of the 
game. Research most similar in nature to this paper was done by Thu et al. (2002) and 
published in the journal Human Organization. This empirical study analyzed fouls in 
                                                 
16 One widely known paper on this subject is Crime on the Court (McCormick and Tollison, 1984) dealing 
with the effect of having three referees instead of two and how it affects fouls called during a game. 
17 European football if you prefer. 
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college basketball and found a relationship between referee foul calling and the televised 
broadcast of the game. 
  Garicano et al. (2005)’s study found favoritism by referees towards the home 
team by lengthening the game when the home team was behind and shortening the game 
when the home team was winning. They argued that the incentive to behave in this 
manner was social pressure by the home soccer fans in the crowd. The referees 
accomplished this by altering the amount of “injury time” added at the end of the 
regulation time period. Injury time can be added to the end of each half and is done so to 
make up for game stoppages like injuries, intentional wasting of time, fighting, or any 
other action not consider part of play. The exact amount of time added was at the 
discretion of the referees. Interesting however, they observed this effect only when the 
contest was close, a one goal lead or deficit. There was no evidence of a referee bias in 
“injury time” favoring the home team when the lead or deficit was larger than one goal. 
There was no statistical difference in the likelihood of scoring a goal during regular or 
injury, so the referees could only increase the period of time possible to score a goal not 
increase the chance of the home time scoring. 
  Rickman and Witt (2005) followed this with similar research on the English 
Premier League with additional work focusing on changes that followed the introduction 
of professional referees. Following the same procedure as Garicano et al. (2005), they 
found evidence of favoritism in close games toward the home team, though not as strong 
of an effect. An explanation as to the different levels a bias in home games depending on 
the country was also presented to explain the difference. Teams relatively close to other 
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members of a soccer league would likely have less of an advantage from referee 
favoritism.  The closer two teams are by distance the less costly it is for fans of the away 
team to attend the games. Therefore, there is less incentive from crowd pressure on the 
referees. This explains why there is a greater “injury time” bias in the U.S. league and a 
relatively much smaller effect in England. Distances between major U.S. cities where the 
MLS teams are located is much greater than the teams in Europe.  
The other important aspect of this paper is the effect of professional referees. In 
the 2001-02 season, the Premier League began using full-time referees. Referees were 
subjected to a new, more stringent system of monitoring performance. They had required 
meetings on officiating games, fitness tests, constant evaluations, and faced sanctions for 
poor performance with the eventual possibility of dismissal. Rickman and Witt (2005) 
found no evidence of favoritism toward the home team after the institution of 
professional referees. It would be more applicable to consider teams in the European 
leagues as individual firms because teams have the possibility of being moved up or 
down in divisional levels depending on that year’s performance. 
 The paper by Thu et al. (2002) runs parallel with the maximizing objective of my 
work by describing a method of using proactive referees to increase athletic conference 
revenues. This paper centers on the cultural aspects of “fair play” within sports, but I 
prefer to focus on the data as it relates to my theory on referees. The research done by 
Thu et al. (2002) found referees were more likely to call a significantly higher number of 
fouls on the team in the lead, but only when the game was televised on the major 
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networks. 18  When games were carried by regions secondary stations, there was no 
significant effect on fouls called on the team with the lead. The conclusion was that 
referees called the game in a way as to keep it competitive, and thereby, more 
entertaining. More entertaining games earn higher television ratings. The broadcast rights 
to air college athletics are typically negotiated at the conference level and not by the 
individual teams.19 There is no direct mention of what incentive a basketball referee has 
to engage in this method of game management outside of the discussion of societal norms 
and the idea of “fair play.” However, with the lucrative contracts awarded to collegiate 
athletic conferences for broadcast rights, it is not difficult to propose a theory where 
referees are working at the behest of the controlling conference agents during the season 
when my theory of proactive referees is concentrated at the end of the season. 
3.3 Defining a Sports League 
 The discussion of what a sports league or association of teams exactly is spans 
law and economic literature, particularly since in this area there is a natural overlap of the 
subject matter. It deals with such issues as antitrust law, organizational business structure, 
competition, monopoly power, social welfare, and how the law should approach 
decisions in this setting. It seems the center of discussion focuses on attempting to 
determine if sports leagues are an alliance of horizontal competitors or a single entity, 
and the legal and economic ramifications of each. 
                                                 
18 ABC, CBS, NBC, and ESPN 
19 An exception is the University of Notre Dame football program. Notre Dame Football is considered 
independent while the basketball program is affiliated with the Big East Conference. The football program 
has an exclusive television contract with NBC for the broadcasting right for home games. 
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 In one particular article, G. Roberts (1989) comments on professional leagues 
such as the NFL, but the ideas put forth in his argument can easily be applied to college 
sports and athletic conference. He argues the league, and not the individual team, is the 
firm of importance when dealing in antitrust analysis. Teams have an economic interest 
that is dependent on the league in professional sports. While each team may be 
independently owned, they are dependent on the existence of the member teams for their 
own continuation as viable enterprises. There is not much reason to watch the Green Bay 
Packers® play football if the other 29 teams do not exist. Of course universities athletics 
could and do exist without the formation of conferences, but that is not what we observe 
in the vast majority of cases.20 There must be some economic interest in the formation of 
these conferences. 
 The paper by Flynn and Gilbert (2001) also deals with professional sports leagues 
and how to analyze them in the legal setting. The argument again hinges on the idea that 
leagues are either individual firms colluding to lessen competition in a cartel fashion, or 
single firms producing one output—professional sports. This paper discusses several 
legal cases involving antitrust matters. The MLB, NFL, and NHL are associations of 
individually owned teams, while the relatively new leagues of Major League Soccer 
(MLS), Women’s National Basketball Association (WNBA), and the possible future 
Women’s Professional Soccer are all organized as single entities. They suggest this is 
done to avoid the antitrust issues the other leagues are forced to navigate. The authors 
present an argument to separate the actions of sports leagues into ex ante (beforehand) 
                                                 
20 Notre Dame Football and the athletic departments of the Army and Navy Service Academies are 
examples. The Air Force Academy, however, is part of the Mountain West Conference. 
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and ex post (after the fact) toward competition issues as a method for determining when 
leagues are acting in a noncompetitive manor. The portion of interest in Flynn and 
Gilbert’s (2001) work is the idea of sports leagues as joint ventures. Professional teams 
like those in the NFL are owned separately, but all the teams of the NFL produce a single 
product—professional football. They would be unable to produce their product without 
each other, so even though each team franchise is independently owned, they are 
dependent on the existence of other franchises.  
3.4 Other Related Works 
 The following papers are used to provide guidance to my research particularly in 
the formation of my model. I did not follow one specific theory or model previously used 
in others’ work because, to my knowledge, one does not exist, but ideas from this 
literature provide some foundation for the assumptions I make. 
The study of sumo wrestling from Duggan and Levitt (2002) provides an example 
of how the marginal value of one more win does not necessarily have to be equal to both 
parties, and this is important in my model of conferences encouraging certain behavior 
from the referees. Duggan and Levitt’s (2002) research into the organized sport of sumo 
wrestling does not deal with the lack of impartiality on the part of referee. Instead, their 
paper suggests a possible arrangement between wrestlers, or at the minimum, a lack of 
effort on the part of certain wrestlers depending on the situation during the competition. 
In sumo wrestling, a tournament consists of 15 bouts. If a wrestler wins eight or more out 
of 15 (called kachi-koshi), the wrestler is guaranteed to increase his ranking. The bouts of 
interest in this paper are when a sumo wrestler enters the final match with a record of 
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seven wins and seven loses against an opponent that has already eight victories. The 
wrestler with an even seven wins and seven loses is considered on the bubble. Duggan 
and Levitt (2002) found a significant effect on likelihood of winning if the wrestler was 
“on the bubble.” Two possible reasons given for this outcome were corruption in the 
matches or extra effort on the part of the wrestler. Further analysis favored corruption as 
the reason sumo wrestlers on the bubble won more often than to be expected. 
Baumol (1962) provides the theory of expansion of the firm has some applications 
for my model. In this paper the theory firms will maximize sales (revenue) as a proxy to 
maximize growth of the firm in the long term instead of profits in an oligopolistic 
industry setting. Profits become a means to acquire capital for continued growth. First, 
when looking at the six major conferences, college basketball could be considered a 
concentrated mutually interdependent business setting as it relates to competition 
between the major conferences. Second, constraints on the conference commissioners 
may lend themselves to revenue maximization with the important difference being that 
the commissioner is not the sole residual claimant, but is an agent. I will elaborate on this 









A MODEL OF CONFERENCE BEHAVIOR 
 
To suggest a method to explain how a firm—in this case, the conference—can 
encourage revenue-enhancing actions by its basketball referees, I must first explain the 
incentives structure. The parties of interest are the individual conference members and 
the conference controlling agent. The relationship within the conference arrangement 
allows both parties to benefit which is why it is the prevailing condition in college sports. 
4. 1 The Conference Member 
 The individual university that elects to become a conference member must do so 
for the benefits that accompany the association. Specifically for the purposes of this 
paper, I can focus on the athletic department, because I assume all decisions made on 
such matters occur here. The sources of revenue can come from different means, but I 
group them into two sources: revenue directly associated with sporting outcomes that can 
be affected by joining a conference, and those revenue sources indirectly associated with 
the results of the game. Though I can attempt to loosely categorize revenue streams, it is 
not necessary to specifically label a revenue source because they are all related. Instead, it 
is more important to understand how joining a conference can increase certain revenue 
sources. Some “direct” sources would be television revenue, payouts from post season 
tournaments or bowl games, and ticket sales. Example of the “non-direct” would be 
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donations to the athletic departments 21 , school affiliated merchandise, localized 
advertisements, and even concession sales of food and beverage. “Non-direct” sources 
are generally paid to a university regardless of conference affiliation.  
 It is possible to begin with the basic profit-maximizing objective. I assume costs 
are fixed or are taken on a yearly basis and have occurred before the start of the athletic 
season, and they can not be altered to have an effect during the season.22 It is feasible to 
model the universities object without fixed costs or some constant marginal cost, but it 
adds nothing to the analysis. In this scenario, profit can only be affected by increasing 




1.2   0== MCMR  
Of more importance is that the proposed total revenue comes from the direct and indirect 
sources. Joining a conference will have a positive effect on direct sources and therefore 
increase total revenue. Payments, regardless of the distribution methods, from events 
such as conference tournaments or larger television contracts would not be available to an 
individual team.  
1.3  ID RRTR +=  
1.4  )()( MemberConferenceDceNoConferenD RR <  
1.5  CMNC Π<Π  
                                                 
21 Some universities have historically poor records of performance on the field and yet donations to the 
athletic department remain relatively robust. Referring to football, one specific school in the state of South 
Carolina comes to mind  
22 Coaches have been hired. Practice and player facilities have been built and funded.  
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As a result, an athletic department maximizes profits by maximizing revenues. They do 
so by joining a conference. Revenue will be higher for an athletic department if the 
university joins a conference as compared to the alternative, the university not being 
affiliated with a conference. It follows, then, that the profits will be greater. When this is 
not the case, there will be no conference affiliation.23  
The athletic directors of the individual universities are not the residual claimants 
as we think of them in the economic theory of the firm. Rather than the residual claimant, 
they are agents with the ability to determine how the funds are spent in the athletic 
departments. Since most funds for the major conferences come from basketball, football, 
and the occasional baseball program, the athletic director determines how these funds are 
distributed to all the other sports, new facilities or renovations, or perhaps the director 
may invest in a new administrative jet.  The utility function of the athletic director could 
be modeled as such: 
1.6   ),,(* EABIfU =  
Where   
I: Income and other monetary bonuses 
 AB: Size of Athletic Budget 
 E: Any extra amenities of the position 
A larger athletic budget (AB) provides opportunity for spending priorities. This is 
increased by revenues from conference affiliation and thereby increasing the utility of the 
director. 
                                                 
23 Notre Dame Football 
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4.2  The Conference Commissioner 
 The conference commissioner has an obvious incentive for the existence and 
growth of the conference and its revenues. The job does not exist without the affiliation 
of the universities. The commissioner is an agent for the principals, or the universities. 
The agent is responsible for acting in the interest of the conference members. The 





1.2   0== MCMR  
As before, I assume costs are fixed for the commissioner. For the commissioner, the cost 
of athletics is largely exogenous because it occurs at the university level. I assume the 
cost of operating a conference management system is negligible compared to the costs of 
the sum total of the universities. The conference agent, therefore, maximizes profits 
where marginal revenue is zero, thereby maximizing total revenues. For the 
commissioner, total revenue is the only revenue source directly related to competition of 
the conference members, so as it relates to universities: 
1.7  DRTR =  
The conference commissioner’s utility function is not the same as the athletic director 
because the revenues are distributed to the member universities, or the residual claimants 
in this case. How the revenues are distributed is determined by conference policy and not 
at the commissioner’s discretion. 
1.8   ),(* EIfU =  
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Where   
I: Income and other monetary bonuses 
 E: Any extra amenities of the position 
Increases in I or E may be dependent on increases in revenues to the member universities. 
This may provide some additional incentive to maximize revenues by the conference 
commissioner.  
 The commissioner also has authority over the Director of Officials. The Director 
of Officials, as the title implies, is responsible for all matters related to conference 
referees: pay, scheduling, grievances, hiring, dismissals, evaluations, etc. The director is 
charged with monitoring the officials throughout the season, so the commissioner only 
needs to construct one covert arrangement with one subordinate employee concerning the 
basketball officials. The Director of Officials has no incentive to encourage such 
behavior without approval from a higher authority, because the director can not directly 
gain from the actions of the referees. Only through the commissioner can the director 
gain from encouraging, by whatever means, subordinates to bias calls during a basketball 
game. The director needs the approval of the commissioner just as the commissioner 
must have the consent of conference members—athough it need not be codified in any 
regulations. In fact, it would be surprising if any physical evidence of such an 
arrangement existed.  
4.3 Misaligned incentives 
The goal of the managing agents of a conference should promote activities 
enhancing revenues to the firm. The willing cooperation of member universities can be 
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explained by joint venture theory, but while proactive officials in certain situations 
benefit the conference it would directly conflict with parties at each individual school. 
The parties are the players, coaches, and fans. I assume with some confidence the main 
goal of the basketball teams is to win regardless of the effect on the conference. Because 
of the NCAA’s cartel-like agreement, the athletes can not legally receive direct payment 
to participate in a sporting event on the college level. This reduces the cost of competing 
for players, particularly football and basketball players, when considering the revenue 
generated by 1-A college football and basketball programs. This makes non-monetary 
rewards relatively more valuable. Players would benefit from such things as positive 
exposure, increased reputation on campus, and better statistics in hopes of reaching the 
professional level. They cannot legally accrue any monetary benefits from losing a game 
intentionally, but do bare the cost of losing. A coach’s pay, bonuses, and tenure at a 
university are normally based in some fashion on performance. I am unaware of any 
contract incentives encouraging coaches to lose games that might benefit the conference. 
Again, any benefits for increasing the likelihood of losing certain games would not 
directly go to the coaching staff. On the other hand, the costs of angering fans, and more 
importantly, members of athletic contribution groups (booster clubs), and losing potential 
recruits would fall on the coaches. A team’s fans certainly would have the least to benefit 
from a “proactive” referee, when it is not in their favor of course. They too bare the cost 
in terms of the loss of utility they associate with a perception of their favorite team being 
disadvantaged. “It makes the conference better off as a whole” would not likely to be an 
acceptable reason to give fans. 
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All of the previously mentioned groups who should oppose to such actions by 
officials may not be enough to dissuade conference management from encouraging the 
behavior. The revenues are distributed directly to the conference headquarters which is 
then distributed to all the universities based on the revenue sharing agreement, but the 
cost of these actions is only placed on the specific teams considered not likely to make 
the tournament. The groups previously mentioned may be disadvantaged, but not to any 
great extent, by proactive officials when it occurs in only a few games. After all, a 
player’s chance of playing professionally is not determined by one or two games. A 
coach being fired is most likely in response to the team’s performance during one or 
more seasons and not a couple of games. Fans rarely, if ever, stop supporting a team 
based on the outcome of one game. 
4.4 Conditions for Tournament Manipulation 
Relating to college basketball, the actions of the controlling agents of each 
conference are charged to act in the interest of the member university. In order to 
maximize monetary revenues, a conference’s director will act in a manner, through the 
Director of Officials, which results in the opportunity for as many member teams to reach 
the tournament as possible. Having more teams in the tournament results in more units to 
accrue for the conference. After enough games have be played to determine the relative 
strength of teams within the conference and the likelihood of reaching the national 
tournament, teams deemed to have the possibility of being selected for the national 
tournament are “assisted.” There are three scenarios of interest where the actions of the 
officials can benefit the conference. Teams certain to make the tournament should have a 
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lower percentage of total fouls called against them when playing a team considered to 
have no chance of reaching the tournament. Teams considered “on the bubble” should 
also have a lower percentage of total fouls called against them when playing a team 
unlikely to make the tournament. The other scenario to consider is when a team certain to 
be selected for the tournament plays a “bubble” team. In this situation, it is important to 
determine the relative value of increasing the likelihood of having another team selected 
from the conference to the national tournament versus a tournament team earning a lower 
seed resulting from a loss.24 If the value of one more team from the conference is higher 
than the value of earning a lower seed for a tournament team, then the bubble team 
should have a lower percentage of total fouls called during the game. Evidence of these 
actions when controlling for other effects may suggest proactive officials attempting to 
influence the outcome of game. 
 A conference is made up of member universities, and in some sense they must all 
be complicit in these actions even with the groups at each university opposed to it. Each 
university must see itself as part of the larger “firm” and act accordingly to be successful. 
As long as proactive officials do not consistently favor specific teams but teams in 
specific situations, then it is possible to speculate the member universities would allow it. 
How is that possible? A hypothetical example may help to explain. Suppose at the end of 
the season, team “A” plays team “B”. Team “A” may possibly make the national 
tournament with one more win. Team “B” has a losing record and no chance of 
qualifying for the tournament. If team “A” wins and is selected for the tournament, the 
                                                 
24 This will be explained later in further detail. 
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conference will increase its revenues by at least one unit.25 Team “B” will share in a 
portion of these revenues depending on the agreement within the conference. If team “B” 
wins, they still finish the season with a losing record. As a result, team “A” will not make 
the tournament and the all the members of the conference receive less from the 
tournament basketball payout. As long as the actions of proactive officials result in 
additional revenues for all conference members they otherwise would not earn acting 














                                                 
25 If team “A” progresses further than the first round it will earn addition units for the conference. Also, it is 
important to remember earning units in the present year effects conference revenue for the next six years. 
26 This line of thinking somewhat follows the paper by Steven D. Levitt on Sumo Wrestling with the idea 





DETERMINING THE EXPECTED VALUE OF NCAA  
TOURNAMENT PAYOUTS 
 
5. 1 Introduction 
 Given the payout structure of the tournament, it was necessary to consider the 
financial benefits of increasing the number of teams in the tournament. This is done by 
determining a specific value of each “seed” in the tournament. Additionally, I want to 
provide support for favoring one team over another. The conference officials will favor a 
“Tournament” team or a “Bubble” team over an “Out” team, but the incentive to assist 
one team over another in the scenario in which a “Tournament” team plays a “Bubble” 
team must be analyzed further to determine how the conference could potentially act to 
increase revenues.  
5.2  Dataset 
The data set is the number of units earned by each “seed” for 1985 through 2006. 
1985 was the first year the men’s tournament expanded to 64 teams split into four 
brackets. The data set is used to determine the probabilities of earning differing numbers 
of units depending on the “seed” selection.  
5.3 The Model 
 The model uses a multinomial logistic based on the different possible number of 
units each seed can earn. With that and the value of a unit from 2005-06, I estimated the 
expected value of a “seed” for a given year. The conferences are paid on a rolling six-
year period, but a team can only affect the number of units in the current year, so the 
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value of a seed is based on a one year period. The value of one 2005-06 unit is $164,000. 
Using this value and the probabilities from a multinomial logistic regression, the 
expected revenues for each seed are determined. The logistic regression, Table [A.0], is 
reported in Appendix A. The following two tables are produced using the logistic 
regression information. Table [5.0] lists the probabilities of each potential number of 
units by each seed. Table [5.1] lists the value of each seed by expected payout and the 

















5.4 Empirical Results and Conclusions 
Table 5.0 Tournaments 1985-2006 Probability of Units Earned by Seed  
   Units   
Seed 1 2 3 4 5 
1 4.45% 22.26% 18.43% 19.92% 34.94% 
2 7.47% 28.17% 21.25% 18.73% 24.38% 
3 11.68% 33.23% 22.83% 16.42% 15.85% 
4 17.11% 36.74% 22.99% 13.49% 9.66% 
5 23.70% 38.38% 21.88% 10.47% 5.56% 
6 31.24% 38.16% 19.82% 7.73% 3.05% 
7 39.42% 36.33% 17.19% 5.47% 1.60% 
8 47.86% 33.27% 14.34% 3.72% 0.81% 
9 56.15% 29.44% 11.56% 2.45% 0.39% 
10 63.92% 25.28% 9.04% 1.56% 0.19% 
11 70.90% 21.15% 6.89% 0.97% 0.09% 
12 76.92% 17.31% 5.14% 0.59% 0.04% 
13 81.95% 13.91% 3.76% 0.35% 0.02% 
14 86.05% 11.02% 2.71% 0.21% 0.01% 
15 89.31% 8.63% 1.94% 0.12% 0.00% 
16 91.87% 6.69% 1.37% 0.07% 0.00% 
      
Payouts $164,000 $328,000 $492,000 $656,000 $820,000 
 














per Seed %  
Difference 
from 1 Seed % 
1 $588,180.23         
2 $531,993.97  -$56,186.25 -10.56% -$56,186.25 -10.56%
3 $478,125.86  -$53,868.11 -11.27% -$110,054.36 -23.02%
4 $429,418.75  -$48,707.11 -11.34% -$158,761.48 -36.97%
5 $386,729.79  -$42,688.95 -11.04% -$201,450.43 -52.09%
6 $349,640.03  -$37,089.76 -10.61% -$238,540.20 -68.22%
7 $317,348.87  -$32,291.16 -10.18% -$270,831.35 -85.34%
8 $289,205.39  -$28,143.48 -9.73% -$298,974.84 -103.38%
9 $264,834.14  -$24,371.25 -9.20% -$323,346.09 -122.09%
10 $244,035.59  -$20,798.55 -8.52% -$344,144.64 -141.02%
11 $226,639.05  -$17,396.55 -7.68% -$361,541.18 -159.52%
12 $212,405.75  -$14,233.30 -6.70% -$375,774.48 -176.91%
13 $201,006.26  -$11,399.49 -5.67% -$387,173.97 -192.62%
14 $192,047.00  -$8,959.25 -4.67% -$396,133.23 -206.27%
15 $185,115.52  -$6,931.48 -3.74% -$403,064.70 -217.74%
16 $179,819.23   -$5,296.30 -2.95%  -$408,361.00 -227.10%








 Tables [5.0] and [5.1] demonstrate, as expected, the lower seeds have a lower 
expected value. Teams are seeded based on relative quality, so the farther from a number-
1 seed, the less likely a team is to continue in the tournament. The data suggests one more 
team qualifying for the tournament is more valuable than a “tournament” team moving 
down one seed. For example, consider two teams within a conference. Team “A” is likely 
to earn a 1 seed and team “B” is considered a bubble team. At the end of the season, these 
two teams play each other. If team “B” wins and then makes the national tournament as a 
16 seed, the conference’s expected payout increases by at least $179,819.27 As a result of 
losing, team “A” will enter the tournament as a 2 seed. The conference loses only 
$56,189 in expected payout. In most cases the small conferences that receive an 
automatic bid to the tournament earn seeds on the low end (12-16) and teams considered 
“bubble” teams from the major conference earning “at large” bids will usually be seeded 
in the next tier (8-12). The explanation for this is that many of the smaller conference 
teams awarded an automatic bid are still considered less skilled than the larger 
conference “bubble” teams uncertain to make the tournament through the “at large” bid 
process. Examining the expected payout for seeds 8 through 12 further strengthens the 
idea that having one more member university in the tournament is more valuable than 
losing a seed ranking for another conference member. The largest possible loss, $56,189, 
is still moving down from a 1 to a 2 seed, but when compared to the value of a 10 seed, 
$244,035.59, the incentive becomes even greater to manipulate the outcome, if possible.  
                                                 
27 This number is actually an overestimation, because the expected payout is based on probabilities. To date 
a (16) seed has never beaten a (1) seed, so until it happens, the increase would be the value of one unit. 
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 The conference commissioner and members must draw the same conclusion that 
additional teams are more valuable to the conference than higher seeds, so this becomes 
the underpinning for the theory presented in this paper. In certain situations, particular 
basketball teams will receive preferential treatment from the referees at the behest of the 
commissioner with full knowledge from the conference members, because doing so is in 
the controlling parties’ interest. The conference employees, the referees, are simply 


















ANAYLSIS OF REFEREE BIAS 
 
6. 1 Introduction 
 The previous chapter focuses on the rationale behind favoring one team over 
another depending what classification the team is assigned. This chapter is the segment 
where I try to find any evidence to support my theory. Referees are the tool with which 
the conference commissioner and the conference members can gain additional revenues 
from the NCAA tournament, so any evidence of bias in fouls called during a game 
provide evidence to indicate neutrality may not always be what is expected from a 
conference employee. Again, this is not focused on the actually game results in college 
basketball, but instead, I am looking specifically at the actions of referees.  
6.2  Dataset 
The data set is from the 2004-05 and 2005-06 seasons for basketball games from 
six major conferences. These six major conferences generally receive the majority of the 
“at-large” bids. In the 2004-05 season, 25 of the 34 “at large” bids went to these six 
conferences. They received 26 of the 34 “at large” bids during the 2005-06 season. As a 
result, the six major conferences earn the majority of the revenues from the tournament. 
The data set covers the last eight games of the regular season, or roughly the last four 
weeks, and the conference tournament games. The vast majority of games within this 
period are intra-conference games. All the observations are between teams within a 
conference to eliminate the problem of games between teams of different conferences. 
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The general rule in that situation is the visiting team’s conference referees will officiate 
the game, but this paper focuses on officials’ effects within their own conference.  
Teams are classified into three groups: “Tournament” teams will make the 
tournament, “Bubble” teams are marginal teams, and “Out” teams will not make the 
tournament.28 Information from the NCAA website is also included demonstrating how 
the distribution of funds for the most recent year is determined and the payout amounts 
for previous years.  
 
Table 6.0 Distribution of Basketball-Related Funds According to Number of Units 
         by Conference, 2000-2005 
Total Projected 
Conferences 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Units Distribution 
ACC 10 15 12 9 19 15 80 $13,118,505 
Big 12 15 9 19 19 14 12 88 $14,430,355 
Big East 13 10 12 14 16 13 78 $12,790,542 
Big Ten . 19 17 13 13 6 16 84 $13,774,430 
Pacific-10 8 17 15 11 4 9 64 $10,494,804 
SEC 16 11 11 12 13 10 73 $11,970,636 
6 Conf. Total 81 79 82 78 72 75 467 $76,579,272 
         
GRAND TOTALS: 124 125 125 125 125 125 749 $122,822,000 
         
(6 Conf. Total) / 
(Grand Total) 65.3% 63.2% 65.6% 62.4% 57.6% 60.0% 62.3% 62.3% 
 
Six out of 31 conferences account for roughly 60% of the total funds paid out each year 




                                                 
28 The classification of teams was changed for three trials of the regression analysis in an attempt to find the 
most accurate results. There are rules used to decide on the classification, but like finding the correct 




Table 6.1 Division I Basketball Fund Payout per Conference 
CONFERENCE 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
Atlantic Coast 7,056,452 7,550,336 9,802,279 9,867,470 11,250,770 
Big 12 6,586,021 6,442,953 9,148,794 10,854,217 12,923,182 
Big East 6,868,279 7,348,993 9,018,096 10,431,326 11,858,920 
Big Ten 7,338,710 8,859,060 12,285,523 13,250,603 13,379,294 
Pacific-10 5,927,419 6,845,638 9,932,976 10,008,434 9,122,246 
Southeastern 7,715,054 7,852,349 9,540,885 10,713,253 12,010,957 
6 Conf. Total $41,491,935  $44,899,329 $59,728,553 $65,125,303  $70,545,369 
      
Grand Total $69,999,996  $75,000,001 $97,499,996 $105,300,001  $113,724,003 
      
(6 Conf. Total)/ 
(Grand Total) 59.3% 59.9% 61.3% 61.8% 62.0% 
      
 
Addition data on all I-A conferences in NCAA is provided in Appendix A. 
6.3 The Model 
The model of fouls called in a game is based on the ratio of fouls called on a 
given team based on the total number of fouls called in a defined period. The dependent 
variable is a transformation of the data to create a ratio of fouls on one team versus the 
total fouls in a given period. The model is a simple Ordinary Least Squares regression. 
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Ideally, the model would also account for other ways officials can effect the game 
such as calling “lane violation,” “traveling,” “palming,” or “double dribble” causing a 
change in possession. Unfortunately when this happens, it is recorded as a turnover in the 
statistics along with events like stepping out of bounds, an errant pass out of bounds, or a 
shot clock violation. Because I am unable to distinguish between player error and calls by 
the officials this data is not included and I focus on fouls. 
The classifications of teams and the three separate regressions specifications are 
as follows. Teams must have a winning record overall and within the conference to be 
considered a “tournament” team. Teams had to have a winning record overall and either a 
winning, even, or one loss below even record within the conference to be considered a 
“bubble” team depending on the number of “bubble” teams needed for the specifications. 
Teams with a losing record overall and within the conference are considered “Out.” The 
data was then modified to vary the number of teams that qualified as bubble teams. One 
Bubble Team: It is the last team to be selected to the tournament from each conference. 
Two Bubble Teams: It is the last team to be selected to the tournament and the next 
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closest by record not selected. Three Bubble Teams: It is the last team to be selected to 
the tournament and the two next closest by record not selected. Variable summaries for 
each set are listed in Table [A.1], [A.2], and [A.3] in Appendix A. 
6.4 Empirical Results and Conclusions 
 The results are listed in Tables [A.4], [A.5], and [A.6] in Appendix A. The 
regression based on the first half of games is the most interesting, Table [A.4]. The 
second half and therefore the total game results are of less interest because of the nature 
of basketball. In basketball, game strategy regularly includes fouling the other team 
intentionally to stop the clock and to regain possession of the ball. This occurs near the 
end of the game and not in the first half. The strategy of fouling another player would 
distort any evidence of proactive officials in the second half. In addition, more 
questionable calls in the second half would be more closely scrutinized than if they 
occurred in the first half.  
 Examining the first half regressions, Table [A.4], the variables of interest are the 
interaction terms. BT is the interaction term for games between teams designated 
“Bubble” and “Tournament.” BO is the interaction term for games between teams 
designated “Bubble” and “Out.” TO is the interaction term for games between teams 
designated “Tournament” and “Out.” All three interaction term effects are small, which is 
expected, because large effects would result from noticeable favoritism during the game, 
and again, the referees will only be able to assist teams in certain situations during the 
game. The strongest support actively participating referees would have been is if all three 
had been negative and significant. Those results would indicate favoritism toward teams 
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in situations benefiting the conference. Had BT been significant and positive while BO 
and TO negative and significant would suggest the regression was not accounting for the 
relative abilities of different teams. It would indicate more talented teams simply foul 
less, because the foul advantage would favor the bubble team when playing a weaker 
team and would go against them when playing a stronger team. There are several possible 
reasons BT was not negative or significant. It is likely because some part of team ability 
is affecting these results. The relative difference between bubble teams and tournament 
teams may not be as large as the relative difference between bubble and tournament when 
compared to teams considered out. The dynamics of determining which outcome benefits 
the conference would change on a weekly basis between these two types of teams at the 
end of the season, making it difficult to actually observe a consistent pattern for a 
particular team(s). In the final weeks of the basketball season, the actual classification 
could change as a result of the previous game while in this model, it remains the same. 
An exact interpretation of the regression results as to the reduction of fouls a team may 
receive is difficult with the current data. My best attempt to analyze the results is to 
present it in percentage terms. For example, when a bubble team plays a team unlikely to 
make the tournament, that team will receive 3.7 % less fouls all else constant. 
 A log model transforming the dependent variable and the RPI difference variable 
was run in addition to the OLS model. The RPI difference variable was scaled to remove 
the negative observations but keep the relative value the same. The results are reported in 
Tables [A.7], [A.8], and [A.9] of Appendix A. Some of the interaction variables were 
significant in this model as well. I am not concerned with the exact size of the effect as I 
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am with having a positive or negative effect where expected. I would not expect the size 
of the effect to be larger than what equates to several fouls within a game in either the log 
model or the previous OLS model because a greater effect would likely indicate an error 
rather than the evidence of referees’ actions I am looking for.  
 Additional analysis done with this data is mentioned in the following. In both 
versions of the model, I tested for heteroscedasticity using the standard White test 
because of the possible variance associated with the difference in RPI ranking. It 
indicated the presences of heteroscedasticity, and the regression was repeated using 
robust standard errors. There was no change in the significance of the variables. I 
experimented with several other modifications made to the model and the regression 
analysis, but there were no conclusive results to reproduce. I included a squared RPI 
difference variable, but the interaction terms were no longer significant. In some 
instances, the sign changed to a positive effect though it was still statistically 
insignificant. 
 While not the focus, another interesting result was the effect on foul ratio when 
playing at home. There was a consistent negative effect on the foul ratio for the home 
team. This suggests the “home-court” advantage is not limited to familiar surroundings 
and a supportive fan base. The effect was highly significant and negative. The result was 
significant in the 1st, 2nd, and game total results. The idea a team receives favorable 
treatment at home in basketball as well as most other sports is not new. This may indicate 
referees can be swayed by the crowd. Again, this brings into question the supposed 
neutrality of officials. Another prospective research theory for that result is keeping the 
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local audience happy may encourage them to attend more games thereby increasing 
attendance revenues.  
 The final analysis I used was an attempt to separate the effect of playing at home 
and the classification of the teams that may both be present in the interaction terms. For 
example, if a bubble team is the away team playing a tournament team at the end of the 
season, I wanted to determine any distinguishable difference in foul calls depending on 
which team has home court. I propose assisting the bubble should occur at either place if 
the conference is interested in gaining additional seeds in the tournament, but would 
directly conflict the advantage of being at home. To do this, I separated the interactions 
terms depending home and away designation. Because some of the games in the data are 
conference tournament games which are played at a neutral sight, I also had separate 
interaction terms for those observations. The results are reported in Tables [A.10], 
[A.11], and [A.12] in Appendix A. There are only a few statistically significant results, so 
I can not provide in any definite support for my theory; however, after analyzing the data, 
there are still some points of interest that allow me to suggest the theory has some 
potential.  
 Again, I focus on the 1st half results reproduced in Table [A.10]. Looking at the 
first two terms (BhTa and BaTh), if I assume there is no bias toward specific teams, and 
assume I am picking up some team difference not accounted for in the RPI difference, 
then we should expect both to be positive because the bubble team is the relatively 
weaker team. Also, we should expect BaTh to have a larger effect than BhTa because in 
this case the tournament team has the home court advantage. However this is not the 
 45
result. There is a smaller positive increase in fouls when the bubble team is the away 
team. The two effects together should indicate a greater advantage to the home 
tournament team. Next, look at the interaction between bubble teams and out teams (BhOa 
and BaOh). All three models have a negative effect on the foul ratio when these two types 
of teams play, but the models including two and three bubble teams actually have the 
larger negative effect on the foul ratio for the bubble team when they are the away team. 
A statistically significant result here would be the strongest evidence to support my 
theory. With more observations for each of the interactions perhaps it would be possible 
to find such a result. There are some significant results when examining the tournament 
teams versus the out teams (ThOa and TaOh), though these are the least interesting because 
this situation is the least likely to require referee bias. The games played on neutral courts 
remove the home-court entanglement issue, but there are very few observations to infer 
anything from the results. Again the home-court effect is present and significant. 
 This is not the first paper to suggest basketball referees favor the home team and 
as cited in the previous research, basketball is not the only sport where a game official is 
not considered neutral. If it is reasonable to accept that a referee will respond to the noise 
of the home crowd during the game, then it is reasonable to believe officials would 
willingly bias the calls during a game in the interest of the conference. The analysis 
presented here no way provides certainty of referee bias, but does lend itself favorably to 
the theory that referees are involved in affecting the game under the direction of the 








The fit of the model is not astounding as shown in the initial regression R-squared 
values regardless of regression parameters, but some significant results with the limited 
data set are encouraging. The strength of my conclusions is limited in quality to the data, 
but with more research it would be possible to provide further evidence of actions that 
seem completely rational in the theoretical sense. 
 If attainable in the future, a more extensive data set would naturally provide a 
stronger base to test the theory of proactive officials. At least five or more seasons would 
allow enough observations to include fixed effects for each season and individual team 
effects. The teams considered “bubble” teams will differ by the season, but specific team 
effects are needed because the style of each team’s play would most likely affect fouls 
called which should remain constant across seasons, possibly only changing under a new 
head coach. A model account for these additional differences between teams would give 
the model more predictive ability.  
 The initial assumption that any observable behavior would be seen in the last 
quarter of the season may likely be in error. The effect on foul calls was significant 
through the entire data set and not just the last quarter of the season. With a more 
extensive data set, I could compare the second half of intra-conference play to first half as 
the control group. If there are no significant results from the first half of conference play 
on fouls while the results from the second half remain significant, then it would provide 
strong support of attempted manipulation by conference officials. It is possible that the 
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last quarter is too long of a period. With more seasons available, I could test one, two, or 
the just the last three games of the season more effectively. This might be the more likely 
scenario because there is more information available about the likelihood of the teams for 
a respected conference that have a chance at being invited to the tournament. This makes 
the marginal value of each game greater as the final game approaches. 
 My analysis did account for the teams being members of different conferences, 
but more research is needed because the conferences do not share revenues in the same 
manner. As an example, I would likely expect this behavior first in the Atlantic Coast 
Conference where revenues are shared equally among the members as opposed to the Big 
East Conference where revenue distribution is weighed more toward performance. How 
exactly to incorporate different payout structures will be left for future endeavors on this 
subject. 
 Another potentially interesting theory to explain the formation of conferences 
separate from this research, though in no way contradictory, is the idea that a conference 
is a means to diversify risk. Not only does the joint-venture nature of conferences 
potentially increase revenues, it can also be a type of insurance against large variations in 
the revenues generated from the major college sports. If we assume the costs of operating 
a competitive athletic department are relatively constant from year to year, or at least 
grow at an expected rate, then universities may prefer a more constant stream of revenues 
that join a conference may provide.  In the same manner as insurance plans protect 
against large loses, joining a conference may reduce variations in revenue associated with 
the athletic teams performance. 
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 After examining the data, evidence of a relationship, however slight, may exist 
between the foul ratio and relative standing within the conference. Controlling for talent 
and venue, if a university is an independent firm competing against the other 330 teams, 
the foul distribution in basketball games will not favor certain teams within a group. If 
groups of these competing universities associate as a joint venture in the form of an 
athletic conference, then the individual school no longer has the incentive to behave in 
the manner we expect from a single firm. Instead, we will see actions that benefit the 
conference, and in turn, the monetary benefits to the member universities increase when 
compared to the university as a single entity. Officials actively involved in basketball 
games near the end of the season would benefit the conference. College basketball is a 
multimillion dollar enterprise with participants heavily invested in securing their portion, 
so referees who are conference employees, acting to this end is rational behavior. 
 Do I think there are set procedure in place for referees handed down by 
conference officials to help certain teams when possible? I hardly doubt it. However, 
what is expected may never be stated explicitly. I do not have any indication as to the 
exact method the conference manager could use to encourage behavior that clearly 
violates the role of the game official. I do think referees are like everyone else and will 
respond to the right incentives, such as calling more tournament games or promotions 
within the conference. It is possible there is nothing suspect happening in the world of 
college sports. Perhaps this paper is just a reflection of my skeptical nature, but as one of 
my advisors to this project said and like many fans of college basketball would echo, 




























Regression Data and Other Additional Information 
 
Table A.0 Multinomial Logistic Regression 
  Number of obs  =    768 
     LR chi2(4)   =   417.83 
     Prob > chi2   =   0.0000 
Log likelihood = -789.21504             Pseudo R2    =   0.2093  
        
Units Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% Conf.Interval     
2        
seed -0.29635 0.02717 -10.91 0.00 -0.3496038 -0.2431  
cons 2.012776 0.255274 7.88 0.00 1.512449 2.513104  
3               
seed -0.38193 0.036811 -10.38 0.00 -0.4540765 -0.30978  
cons 1.857764 0.296365 6.27 0.00 1.2769 2.438629  
4               
seed -0.55355 0.06016 -9.2 0.00 -0.6714642 -0.43564  
cons 1.99626 0.357576 5.58 0.00 1.295423 2.697097  
5               
seed -0.90728 0.098817 -9.18 0.00 -1.100957 -0.7136  
cons 3.101244 0.381826 8.12 0.00 2.352878 3.84961  
          





















Table A.1 One Bubble Team 
  Variables Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Description 
         
  1st Half R 611 0.487 0.100 0.143 0.762 Teami 1st Half Fouls / 1st Half Foul Total 
  2nd Half R 611 0.489 0.102 0.167 0.875 Teami 2nd Half Fouls / 2nd Half Foul Total 
  Game Total R 612 0.488 0.075 0.238 0.711 Teami Game Fouls / Game Total Foul Total 




0.272 Log Teami 1st Half Fouls / 1st Half Foul Total 




0.134 Log Teami 2nd Half Fouls / 2nd Half Foul Total 




0.342 Log Teami Game Fouls / Game Total Foul Total 
         
  BT 612 0.069 0.253 0 1 
Interaction term between Teami "bubble" and 
Opponent "tournt" 
  BO 612 0.095 0.293 0 1 
Interaction term between Teami "bubble" and 
Opponent "out" 
  TO 612 0.355 0.479 0 1 
Interaction term between Teami "tournt" and 
Opponent "out" 
  Split 612 0.472 0.500 0 1 
Last two weeks of regular season and tour. games 
dummy var.  
  Year06 612 0.464 0.499 0 1 2006 season dummy var.  
  RPI_diff 612 -43.203 72.857 -278 198 Teami RPI minus opponet RPI 
  Logrpi_dif 612 5.393 0.454 0 6.168 Log of (Teami RPI minus opponet RPI) 
  Home 612 0.415 0.493 0 1 Game play at Teami home court dummy var.  
  Ctourg 612 0.178 0.383 0 1 Conference tournament game dummy var.  
  ACC 612 0.163 0.370 0 1 Conference dummy variable 
  Bigeast 612 0.198 0.399 0 1 Conference dummy variable 
  Big12 612 0.172 0.377 0 1 Conference dummy variable 
  Big10 612 0.170 0.376 0 1 Conference dummy variable 
  SEC 612 0.162 0.369 0 1 Conference dummy variable 
  PAC10 612 0.136 0.343 0 1 Default conference 


















Table A.2 Two Bubble Teams 
  Variables Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Description 
         
  1st Half R 611 0.488 0.100 0.143 0.762 Teami 1st Half Fouls / 1st Half Foul Total 
  2nd Half R 611 0.487 0.102 0.167 0.875 Teami 2nd Half Fouls / 2nd Half Foul Total 
  Game Total R 612 0.487 0.075 0.238 0.711 Teami Game Fouls / Game Total Foul Total 
 Log 1st Half R 611 -0.741 0.222 
-
1.946 -0.272 Log Teami 1st Half Fouls / 1st Half Foul Total 
 Log 2nd Half R 611 -0.743 0.224 
-
1.792 -0.134 Log Teami 2nd Half Fouls / 2nd Half Foul Total 
 LogGameTotalR 612 -0.731 0.158 
-
1.435 -0.342 Log Teami Game Fouls / Game Total Foul Total 
         
  BT 612 0.145 0.353 0 1 
Interaction term between Teami "bubble" and 
Opponent "tournt" 
  BO 612 0.157 0.364 0 1 
Interaction term between Teami "bubble" and 
Opponent "out" 
  TO 612 0.328 0.470 0 1 
Interaction term between Teami "tournt" and 
Opponent "out" 
  Split 612 0.472 0.500 0 1 
Last two weeks of regular season and tour. games 
dummy var.  
  Year06 612 0.464 0.499 0 1 2006 season dummy var.  
  RPI_diff 612 -43.203 72.857 -278 198 Teami RPI minus opponet RPI 
  Logrpi_dif 612 5.393 0.454 0 6.168 Log of (Teami RPI minus opponet RPI) 
  Home 612 0.415 0.493 0 1 Game play at Teami home court dummy var.  
  Ctourg 612 0.178 0.383 0 1 Conference tournament game dummy var.  
  ACC 612 0.163 0.370 0 1 Conference dummy variable 
  Bigeast 612 0.198 0.399 0 1 Conference dummy variable 
  Big12 612 0.172 0.377 0 1 Conference dummy variable 
  Big10 612 0.170 0.376 0 1 Conference dummy variable 
  SEC 612 0.162 0.369 0 1 Conference dummy variable 
  PAC10 612 0.136 0.343 0 1 Default conference 

















Table A.3 Three Bubble Teams 
  Variables Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Description 
         
  1st Half R 611 0.488 0.100 0.143 0.762 Teami 1st Half Fouls / 1st Half Foul Total 
  2nd Half R 611 0.489 0.102 0.167 0.875 Teami 2nd Half Fouls / 2nd Half Foul Total 
  Game Total R 612 0.488 0.075 0.273 0.762 Teami Game Fouls / Game Total Foul Total 
 Log 1st Half R 611 -0.741 0.222 -1.946 -0.272 Log Teami 1st Half Fouls / 1st Half Foul Total 
 Log 2nd Half R 611 -0.739 0.223 -1.792 -0.134 
Log Teami 2nd Half Fouls / 2nd Half Foul 
Total 
 LogGameTotalR 612 -0.729 0.157 -1.299 -0.272 
Log Teami Game Fouls / Game Total Foul 
Total 
         
  BT 612 0.204 0.403 0 1 
Interaction term between Teami "bubble" and 
Opponent "tournt" 
  BO 612 0.221 0.415 0 1 
Interaction term between Teami "bubble" and 
Opponent "out" 
  TO 612 0.275 0.447 0 1 
Interaction term between Teami "tournt" and 
Opponent "out" 
  Split 612 0.472 0.500 0 1 
Last two weeks of regular season and tour. 
games dummy var.  
  Year06 612 0.464 0.499 0 1 2006 season dummy var.  
  RPI_diff 612 -43.203 72.857 -278 198 Teami RPI minus opponet RPI 
  Logrpi_dif 612 5.407 0.460 0 6.168 Log of (Teami RPI minus opponet RPI) 
  Home 612 0.415 0.493 0 1 Game play at Teami home court dummy var.  
  Ctourg 612 0.178 0.383 0 1 Conference tournament game dummy var.  
  ACC 612 0.163 0.370 0 1 Conference dummy variable 
  Bigeast 612 0.198 0.399 0 1 Conference dummy variable 
  Big12 612 0.172 0.377 0 1 Conference dummy variable 
  Big10 612 0.170 0.376 0 1 Conference dummy variable 
  SEC 612 0.162 0.369 0 1 Conference dummy variable 
  PAC10 612 0.136 0.343 0 1 Default conference 


















  Table A.4 Effects on 1st Half Foul Ratio   
               
   One Bubble Team  Two Bubble Teams  Three Bubble Teams  
  BT 0.0170  0.0167  0.0145  0.0144  0.0111  0.0115  
  BO -0.0370*  -0.0363*  -0.0219  -0.0217  -0.0274*  -0.0277*  
  TO -0.0341**  -0.0339**  -0.0364**  -0.0362**  -0.0398**  -0.0400**  
  Split 0.0009    -0.0019    -0.0027    
  Year06 0.0110  0.0010  0.0070  -0.0020  0.0101  -0.0029  
  RPI_diff -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  






















  Acc -0.0145  -0.0145  -0.0105  -0.0105  0.0044  0.0045  
  Big_east 0.0058  0.0057  0.0105  0.0105  0.0236  0.0236  
  Big_12 -0.0002  0.0002  0.0062  0.0065  0.0110  0.0115  
  Big_10 0.0025  0.0025  0.0072  0.0073  0.0151  0.0151  
  Sec -0.0245  -0.0236  -0.0152  -0.0150  -0.0011  -0.0007  
  Constant 0.5355***  0.5392***  0.5309***  0.5332***  0.5233***  0.5267***  
                           
               
  Rsquared 0.1413  0.139  0.1389  0.138  0.1375  0.1356  
               























  Table A.5 Effects on 2nd Half Foul Ratio    
                
   One Bubble Team  Two Bubble Teams  Three Bubble Teams   
  BT 0.0106  0.0111  0.0056  0.0058  0.0072  0.0065   
  BO 0.0020  0.0008  0.0051  0.0048  -0.0040  -0.0035   
  TO -0.0136  -0.0138  -0.0166  -0.0170  -0.0325*  -0.0323*   
  Split -0.0076    -0.0125    -0.0124     
  Year06 -0.0173  -0.0077  -0.0148  -0.0122  -0.0176  -0.0122   
  RPI_diff 0.0002*  0.0001*  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001   








0.0493***  -0.0494***   
  Ctourg 0.0080  -0.0031  0.0063  -0.0035  0.0054  -0.0062   
  Acc 0.0006  0.0007  -0.0073  -0.0074  0.0013  0.0012   
  Big_east -0.0126  -0.0126  -0.0128  -0.0128  -0.0121  -0.0121   
  Big_12 0.0170  0.0165  0.0122  0.0116  0.0086  0.0079   
  Big_10 0.0292*  0.0291*  0.0258  0.0256  0.0242  0.0241   
  Sec -0.0014  -0.0029  -0.0034  -0.0040  -0.0004  -0.0011   
  Constant 0.5257***  0.5199***  0.5264***  0.5215***  0.5308***  0.5250***   
                            
                
  Rsquared 0.1122  0.1068  0.1065  0.1026  0.1145  0.1091   
                























  Table A.6  Effects on Game Total Foul Ratio    
                
   One Bubble Team  Two Bubble Teams  Three Bubble Teams   
  BT 0.0120  0.0121  0.0102  0.0102  0.0091  0.0089   
  BO -0.0149  -0.0151  -0.0040  -0.0041  -0.0120  -0.0119   
  TO -0.0222**  -0.0222**  -0.0230**  -0.0232**  
-
0.0340***  -0.0339***   
  Split -0.0036    -0.0076    -0.0080     
  Year06 -0.0037  -0.0036  -0.0041  -0.0075  -0.0044  -0.0080   
  RPI_diff 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000   








0.0594***  -0.0594***   
  Ctourg -0.0177*  -0.0201**  -0.0142  -0.0169*  -0.0205*  -0.0234**   
  Acc -0.0059  -0.0059  -0.0087  -0.0087  0.0026  0.0026   
  Big_east -0.0041  -0.0041  -0.0019  -0.0019  0.0044  0.0044   
  Big_12 0.0105  0.0104  0.0103  0.0101  0.0108  0.0106   
  Big_10 0.0206*  0.0206*  0.0209*  0.0209*  0.0237*  0.0237*   
  Sec -0.0105  -0.0108  -0.0071  -0.0072  0.0010  0.0008   
  Constant 0.5295***  0.5283***  0.5269***  0.5256***  0.5262***  0.5248***   
                            
                
  Rsquared 0.2036  0.2032  0.2034  0.2029  0.2047  0.204   
                






















 Table A.7 Effects on 1st Half Foul Ratio (Log) 
    
          








Teams   
  BT 0.0379  0.0409  0.0285   
  BO -0.0920*  -0.0443  -0.0588*   
  TO -0.0890***  -0.0878***  -0.0963***   
  Year06 0.0114  0.0032  0.0012   
  Log(RPI_diff) -0.0402*  -0.0438*  -0.0503**   
  Home -0.1500***  -0.1511***  -0.1498***   
  Ctourg -0.0696***  -0.0514*  -0.0731***   
  Acc -0.0148  -0.0047  0.0258   
  Big_east 0.0166  0.0276  0.0544   
  Big_12 0.0070  0.0204  0.0299   
  Big_10 0.0059  0.0156  0.0326   
  Sec -0.0486  -0.0307  -0.0009   
  Constant -0.4126***  -0.4094***  -0.3856***   
                
          
  R-squared .1390  .1376  .1339   
          























 Table A.8 Effects on 2nd Half Foul Ratio (Log) 
     
          








Teams   
  BT 0.0325  0.0192  0.0207   
  BO -0.0086  -0.0028  -0.0151   
  TO -0.0498*  -0.0590*  -0.0870**   
  Year06 -0.0167  -0.0261  -0.0256   
  Log(RPI_diff) 0.0329  0.0231  0.0085   
  Home -0.1068***  -0.1039***  -0.1063***   
  Ctourg -0.0084  -0.0078  -0.0120   
  Acc 0.0163  0.0013  0.0189   
  Big_east -0.0224  -0.0226  -0.0213   
  Big_12 0.0476  0.0386  0.0290   
  Big_10 0.0662  0.0589  0.0557   
  Sec -0.0044  -0.0061  0.0001   
  Constant -0.8638***  -0.8052***  -0.7170***   
                
          
  R-squared .1018  .0989  .1080   
          























 Table A.9 Effects on Game Total Foul Ratio (Log) 
     
          







Teams   
  BT 0.0310  0.0302  0.0256   
  BO -0.0440*  -0.0146  -0.0282   
  TO -0.0655***  -0.0663***  -0.0848***   
  Year06 -0.0050  -0.0137  -0.0144   
  Log(RPI_diff)  0.0029  -0.0025  -0.0128   
  Home -0.1250***  -0.1237***  -0.1245***   
  Ctourg -0.0405**  -0.0324*  -0.0449**   
  Acc -0.0069  -0.0109  0.0116   
  Big_east -0.0096  -0.0045  0.0083   
  Big_12 0.0252  0.0256  0.0247   
  Big_10 0.0401  0.0409  0.0465*   
  Sec -0.0263  -0.0184  -0.0021   
  Constant -0.6625***  -0.6401***  -0.5838***   
                
          
  R-squared .2030  .2043  .2084   
          























 Table A.10 Effects on 1st Half Foul Ratio (Home, Away, Neutral) 
      
          







Teams   
  BhTa 0.0286  0.0263  0.0288   
  BaTh 0.0123  0.0066  0.0073   
  BhOa -0.0446*  -0.0228  -0.0183   
  BaOh -0.0280  -0.0235  -0.0314   
  ThOa -0.0450**  -0.0428**  -0.0471*   
  TaOh -0.0140  -0.0222  -0.0202   
  BTn -0.0009  0.0045  -0.0176   
  BOn -0.0200  -0.0149  -0.0337   
  TOn -0.0399*  -0.0450*  -0.0617**   
  Year06 0.0014  -0.0027  -0.0032   
  RPI_diff -0.0000  -0.0001  -0.0001   
  Home -0.0570***  -0.0659***  -0.0695***   
  Ctourg -0.0218  -0.0213  -0.0223   
  Acc -0.0138  -0.0090  0.0059   
  Big_east 0.0044  0.0101  0.0232   
  Big_12 0.0001  0.0075  0.0121   
  Big_10 0.0021  0.0081  0.0157   
  Sec -0.0214  -0.0140  0.0001   
  Constant 0.5307***  0.5293***  0.5219***   
              
  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001    


















 Table A.11 Effects on 2nd Half Foul Ratio (Home, Away, Neutral) 
      
          







Teams   
  BhTa -0.0034  -0.0077  0.0127   
  BaTh 0.0153  0.0171  0.0148   
  BhOa 0.0082  0.0365  0.0385*   
  BaOh -0.0216  -0.0462*  -0.0428*   
  ThOa -0.0049  -0.0063  -0.0106   
  TaOh -0.0348*  -0.0462**  -0.0671***   
  BTn 0.0326  0.0060  -0.0130   
  BOn 0.0371  0.0346  -0.0202   
  TOn 0.0013  0.0034  -0.0261   
  Year06 -0.0057  -0.0100  -0.0106   
  RPI_diff 0.0002*  0.0001  0.0001   
  Home -0.0621***  -0.0714***  -0.0840***   
  Ctourg -0.0228  -0.0351*  -0.0202   
  Acc 0.0006  -0.0066  0.0036   
  Big_east -0.0132  -0.0155  -0.0131   
  Big_12 0.0171  0.0107  0.0096   
  Big_10 0.0305*  0.0272  0.0261   
  Sec -0.0014  -0.0036  0.0022   
  Constant 0.5282***  0.5372***  0.5397***   
              
  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001    


















 Table A.12 Effects on Game Total Foul Ratio (Home, Away, Neutral) 
      
          






Teams   
  BhTa 0.0108  0.0101  0.0221   
  BaTh 0.0110  0.0116  0.0096   
  BhOa -0.0126  0.0122  0.0157   
  BaOh -0.0260  -0.0325*  -0.0360**   
  ThOa -0.0209  -0.0187  -0.0226   
  TaOh -0.0257*  -0.0339**  -0.0465***   
  BTn 0.0161  0.0042  -0.0149   
  BOn 0.0122  0.0164  -0.0230   
  TOn -0.0180  -0.0172  -0.0414*   
  Year06 -0.0022  -0.0066  -0.0072   
  RPI_diff 0.0001  0.0001  0.0000   
  Home -0.0621***  -0.0708***  -0.0807***   
  Ctourg -0.0247*  -0.0309*  -0.0246   
  Acc -0.0056  -0.0080  0.0043   
  Big_east -0.0050  -0.0038  0.0036   
  Big_12 0.0107  0.0098  0.0116   
  Big_10 0.0212*  0.0219*  0.0249*   
  Sec -0.0087  -0.0068  0.0027   
  Constant 0.5298***  0.5332***  0.5321***   
                
  * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001    


















Table A.13 Additional Complete NCAA Payout for All Conferences 
          Division I Basketball Fund   
      
CONFERENCE 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 
America East 658,602 704,698 784,182 845,783 912,225 
Atlantic 10 3,951,613 4,429,530 4,705,094 4,369,880 5,017,235 
Atlantic Coast 7,056,452 7,550,336 9,802,279 9,867,470 11,250,770 
Atlantic Sun 658,602 805,369 1,045,576 986,747 1,064,262 
Big 12 6,586,021 6,442,953 9,148,794 10,854,217 12,923,182 
Big East 6,868,279 7,348,993 9,018,096 10,431,326 11,858,920 
Big Sky 752,688 704,698 914,879 986,747 1,064,262 
Big South 470,430 604,027 784,182 845,783 912,225 
Big Ten 7,338,710 8,859,060 12,285,523 13,250,603 13,379,294 
Big West 564,516 704,698 914,879 986,747 1,216,299 
Colonial 752,688 704,698 1,045,576 1,127,711 1,064,262 
Conference USA 4,422,043 4,127,517 4,574,397 4,933,735 6,081,497 
Horizon League 1,129,032 1,208,054 1,437,668 1,973,494 1,672,412 
Independents 0 0 0 0 0 
Ivy Group 752,688 805,369 914,879 986,747 912,225 
Metro Atlantic 752,688 604,027 784,182 845,783 1,064,262 
Mid-American 1,317,204 1,308,725 1,960,456 2,255,422 2,128,524 
Mid-Continent 658,602 805,369 1,045,576 1,127,711 912,225 
Mid-Eastern 658,602 805,369 1,045,576 986,747 1,064,262 
Missouri Valley 1,599,462 1,610,738 2,483,244 2,819,277 3,040,749 
Mountain West 282,258 402,685 1,045,576 1,691,566 2,280,561 
Northeast 564,516 604,027 784,182 845,783 912,225 
Ohio Valley 564,516 604,027 784,182 845,783 912,225 
Pacific-10 5,927,419 6,845,638 9,932,976 10,008,434 9,122,246 
Southeastern 7,715,054 7,852,349 9,540,885 10,713,253 12,010,957 
Southern 752,688 805,369 1,045,576 845,783 912,225 
Southland 564,516 604,027 784,182 845,783 912,225 
Southwestern 564,516 604,027 784,182 845,783 912,225 
Sun Belt 658,602 604,027 784,182 845,783 912,225 
The Patriot League 564,516 604,027 784,182 845,783 912,225 
West Coast 1,505,376 1,711,409 2,091,153 2,537,349 2,888,711 
Western 3,387,097 3,624,161 4,443,700 3,946,988 3,496,861 










Table A.14 Additional Complete NCAA Units for All Conferences Distribution of 
          Basketball-Related Funds According to Number of Units  
         
Total Projected 
Conferences 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Units Distribution 
America East Conf. 1 1 1 1 1 2 7 $1,147,869 
Atlantic 10 Conf. 4 7 2 4 10 1 28 $4,591,477 
Atlantic Coast Conf. 10 15 12 9 19 15 80 $13,118,505 
Atlantic Sun 1 2 1 1 1 1 7 $1,147,869 
Big 12 Conf. 15 9 19 19 14 12 88 $14,430,355 
Big East Conf. 13 10 12 14 16 13 78 $12,790,542 
Big Sky Conf. 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 $983,888 
Big South Conf. 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 $983,888 
Big Ten Conf. 19 17 13 13 6 16 84 $13,774,430 
Big West Conf. 1 2 1 1 2 3 10 $1,639,813 
Colonial Athletic Assoc. 1 1 2 1 1 1 7 $1,147,869 
Conference USA 5 5 4 9 11 10 44 $7,215,178 
Horizon League 1 2 1 4 1 3 12 $1,967,776 
Ivy Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 $983,888 
Metro Atlantic Ath. Conf. 1 1 1 1 2 1 7 $1,147,869 
Mid-American Conf. 1 2 4 2 1 1 11 $1,803,794 
Mid-Continent Conf. 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 $983,888 
Mid-Eastern Athletic 1 2 1 1 1 1 7 $1,147,869 
Missouri Valley Conf. 2 3 5 2 2 4 18 $2,951,664 
Mountain West 3 1 4 4 3 4 19 $3,115,645 
Northeast Conf. 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 $983,888 
Ohio Valley Conf. 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 $983,888 
Pacific-10 Conf. 8 17 15 11 4 9 64 $10,494,804 
Southeastern Conf. 16 11 11 12 13 10 73 $11,970,636 
Southern Conf. 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 $983,888 
Southland Conf. 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 $983,888 
Southwestern Athl. Conf. 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 $983,888 
Sun Belt Conf. 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 $983,888 
The Patriot League 1 1 1 1 1 2 7 $1,147,869 
West Coast Conf. 5 3 2 3 2 3 18 $2,951,664 
Western Athletic Conf. 5 3 3 2 4 3 20 $3,279,626 
GRAND TOTALS: 124 125 125 125 125 125 749 $122,822,000 
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